By Ibrahim Alusine Kamara (Kamalo)
The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone underwent a comprehensive review during the Ernest Bai Koroma–led All Peoples’ Congress (APC) administration. That process was spearheaded by a committee of carefully selected legal luminaries and respected national stakeholders drawn across party lines and regions, under the chairmanship of the late Justice Edmond Cowan. After extensive consultations, the committee produced a reviewed draft constitution, followed by a White Paper, which was poised for publication as a precursor to a national referendum that would have conferred full legal force on the amended document.That process, however, was abruptly halted by a change of government. The APC administration lost power, and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), under President Julius Maada Bio, assumed office. With that political transition, the Cowan-led constitutional review was effectively shelved .Nearly eight years later, the reviewed Constitution has once again been subjected to another amendment process—this time under the Maada Bio administration. Critics contend that this new review has been carried out in a largely opaque and stealthy manner, lacking the broad-based transparency and consensus-building that ordinarily accompany constitutional reforms in democratic societies. As the draft amended constitution circulates, several sections and clauses have drawn sharp criticism from legal experts, civil society actors, and political commentators. These provisions have been described as faulty, problematic, risky, and in some cases fundamentally undemocratic, with critics arguing that they depart from established constitutional principles and widely accepted global democratic best practices.One of the most contentious provisions is Clause 42(2)(e) of the draft amended constitution, which introduces a new threshold for presidential victory. Under this proposal, the long-standing requirement of securing at least 55 percent of the valid votes cast to be declared president is replaced with a dual threshold: a simple majority of the national vote, combined with at least 20 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the political districts.Critics argue that this formula could unfairly disadvantage a candidate who enjoys overwhelming national popularity but fails to secure the stipulated 20 percent in a sufficient number of districts. In such a scenario, a candidate could win the popular vote convincingly yet be denied victory due to geographic vote distribution. Furthermore, analysts warn that a president elected by a razor-thin simple majority under this system could emerge with diminished moral authority and political legitimacy, especially in a deeply polarized polity.Equally controversial are the proposed changes to the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system. The amendment seeks to remove Section 38A of the Constitution, which previously defined PR as a temporary electoral arrangement. It further proposes amending Section 74(1)(b) to allow a category of legislators to be elected through PR, while leaving the critical details—such as seat allocation formulas, thresholds, and safeguards—to be determined later by Parliament.Opponents view this approach as dangerous. They argue that leaving such a consequential electoral system undefined and subject to future legislative discretion opens the door to manipulation—particularly in circumstances where the ruling party enjoys numerical dominance in Parliament. Without constitutional safeguards, the PR system could be tailored to serve partisan interests rather than democratic fairness.Another flashpoint is Section 32 of the draft amendment, which addresses the appointment of commissioners to the Electoral Commission for Sierra Leone (ECSL). The provision proposes the establishment of a Search and Nomination Committee tasked with selecting the Chief Electoral Commissioner and other commissioners. However, Clause 32(3) grants the President the power to appoint members of this very committee.For critics, this arrangement strikes at the heart of electoral independence. Empowering the President to appoint those who, in turn, nominate and approve electoral commissioners creates an obvious conflict of interest. If enacted, they argue, the ECSL risks becoming institutionally compromised, with committee members reduced to mere extensions of executive influence—more loyal to presidential whims than to democratic integrity.Taken together, critics maintain that these and other provisions in the 2025 Constitution Amendment Bill fall well outside the norms of genuine democracy. They accuse the SLPP “Paopa” faction of being fully aware of the anti-democratic implications of these clauses, but proceeding nonetheless in pursuit of entrenching itself in power. According to this view, the willingness to sidestep established democratic conventions has become a troubling hallmark of the current constitutional reform agenda.As alarming as these proposals appear, many argue that they must not be enacted in their present form. Any constitutional amendment, especially one with far-reaching implications for elections and governance, must be rooted in transparency, inclusivity, and democratic consensus. Without substantial modification to align these provisions with democratic tenets and global best practices, the risk is not merely legal controversy—but long-term damage to Sierra Leone’s democratic foundations.